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Abstract
We prove that it is PPAD-hard to compute a Nash equilibrium in a tree polymatrix game with twenty
actions per player. This is the first PPAD hardness result for a game with a constant number of actions
per player where the interaction graph is acyclic. Along the way we show PPAD-hardness for finding
an -fixed point of a 2D-LinearFIXP instance, when  is any constant less than (
√
2− 1)/2 ≈ 0.2071.
This lifts the hardness regime from polynomially small approximations in k-dimensions to constant
approximations in two-dimensions, and our constant is substantial when compared to the trivial
upper bound of 0.5.
Keywords and phrases Nash Equilibria, Polymatrix Games, PPAD, Brouwer Fixed Points
ar
X
iv
:2
00
2.
12
11
9v
1 
 [c
s.G
T]
  2
7 F
eb
 20
20
XX:2 Tree Polymatrix Games are PPAD-hard
1 Introduction
A polymatrix game is a succinctly represented many-player game. The players are represented
by vertices in an interaction graph, where each edge of the graph specifies a two-player game
that is to be played by the adjacent vertices. Each player picks a pure strategy, or action, and
then plays that action in all of the edge-games that they are involved with. They then receive
the sum of the payoffs from each of those games. A Nash equilibrium prescribes a mixed
strategy to each player, with the property that no player has an incentive to unilaterally
deviate from their assigned strategy.
Constant-action polymatrix games have played a central role in the study of equilibrium
computation. The classical PPAD-hardness result for finding Nash equilibria in bimatrix
games [4] uses constant-action polymatrix games as an intermediate step in the reduction [4,5].
Rubinstein later showed that there exists a constant  > 0 such that computing an -
approximate Nash equilibrium in two-action bipartite polymatrix games is PPAD-hard [15],
which was the first result of its kind to give hardness for constant .
These hardness results create polymatrix games whose interaction graphs contain cycles.
This has lead researchers to study acyclic polymatrix games, with the hope of finding
tractable cases. Kearns, Littman, and Singh claimed to produce a polynomial-time algorithm
for finding a Nash equilibrium in a two-action tree graphical game [11], where graphical
games are a slight generalization of polymatrix games. However, their algorithm does not
work, which was pointed out by Elkind, Goldberg, and Goldberg [9], who also showed that
the natural fix gives an exponential-time algorithm.
Elkind, Goldberg, and Goldberg also show that a Nash equilibrium can be found in
polynomial time for two-action graphical games whose interaction graphs contain only paths
and cycles. They also show that finding a Nash equilibrium is PPAD-hard when the interaction
graph has pathwidth at most four, but there appears to be some issues with their approach
(see Appendix A). Later work of Barman, Ligett, and Piliouras [1] provided a QPTAS for
constant-action tree polymatrix games, and then Ortiz and Irfan [13] gave an FPTAS for
this case. All three papers, [1,9,13], leave as a main open problem the question of whether it
is possible to find a Nash equilibrium in a tree polymatrix in polynomial time.
Our contribution. In this work we show that finding a Nash equilibrium in twenty-
action tree polymatrix games is PPAD-hard. Combined with the known PPAD containment
of polymatrix games [5], this implies that the problem is PPAD-complete. This is the first
hardness result for polymatrix (or graphical) games in which the interaction graph is acyclic,
and decisively closes the open question raised by prior work: tree polymatrix games cannot
be solved in polynomial time unless PPAD is equal to P.
Our reduction produces a particularly simple class of interaction graphs: all of our games
are played on caterpillar graphs (see Figure 3) which consist of a single path with small
one-vertex branches affixed to every node. These graphs have pathwidth 1, so we obtain a
stark contrast with prior work: two-action path polymatrix games can be solved in polynomial
time [9], but twenty-action pathwidth-1-caterpillar polymatrix games are PPAD-hard.
Our approach is founded upon Mehta’s proof that 2D-LinearFIXP is PPAD-hard [12].
We show that her reduction can be implemented by a synchronous arithmetic circuit with
constant width. We then embed the constant-width circuit into a caterpillar polymatrix
game, where each player in the game is responsible for simulating all gates at a particular
level of the circuit. This differs from previous hardness results [5, 15], where each player is
responsible for simulating exactly one gate from the circuit.
Along the way, we also substantially strengthen Mehta’s hardness result for LinearFIXP.
A. Deligkas, J. Fearnley, and R. Savani XX:3
She showed PPAD-hardness for finding an exact fixed point of a 2D-LinearFIXP instance, and
an -fixed point of a kD-LinearFIXP instance, where  is polynomially small. We show PPAD-
hardness for finding an -fixed point of a 2D-LinearFIXP instance when  is any constant
less than (
√
2 − 1)/2 ≈ 0.2071. So we have lifted the hardness regime from polynomially
small approximations in k-dimensions to constant approximations in two-dimensions, and
our constant is substantial when compared to the trivial upper bound of 0.5.
Related work. The class PPAD was defined by Papadimitriou [14]. Years later, Daskalakis,
Goldberg, and Papadimitriou (DGP) [5] proved PPAD-hardness for graphical games and
3-player normal form games. Chen, Deng, and Teng (CDT) [4] extended this result to
2-player games and proved that there is no FPTAS for the problem unless PPAD = P. The
observations made by CDT imply that DGP’s result also holds for polymatrix games with
constantly-many actions (but with cycles in the interaction graph) for an exponentially
small . More recently, Rubinstein [16] showed that there exists a constant  > 0 such that
computing an −NE in binary-action bipartite polymatrix games is PPAD-hard (again with
cycles in the interaction graph).
Etessami and Yiannakakis [10] defined the classes FIXP and LinearFIXP and they proved
that LinearFIXP = PPAD. Mehta [12] strengthened these results by proving that two-
dimensional LinearFIXP equals PPAD, building on the result of Chen and Deng who proved
that 2D-discrete Brouwer is PPAD-hard [3].
On the positive side, Cai and Daskalakis [2], proved that NE can be efficiently found in
polymatrix games where every 2-player game is zero-sum. Ortiz and Irfan [13] and Deligkas,
Fearnley, and Savani [7] produced QPTASs for polymatrix games of bounded treewidth (in
addition to the FPTAS of [13] for tree polymatrix games mentioned above). For general
polymatrix games, the only positive result to date is a polynomial-time algorithm to compute
a ( 12 + δ)-NE [8]. Finally, an empirical study on algorithms for exact and approximate NE in
polymatrix games can be found in [6].
2 Preliminaries
Polymatrix games. An n-player polymatrix game is defined by an undirected interaction
graph G = (V,E) with n vertices, where each vertex represents a player, and the edges of
the graph specify which players interact with each other. Each player in the game has m
actions, and each edge (v, u) ∈ E of the graph is associated with two m×m matrices Av,u
and Au,v which specify a bimatrix game that is to be played between the two players, where
Av,u specifies the payoffs to player v from their interaction with player u.
Each player in the game selects a single action, and then plays that action in all of the
bimatrix games with their neighbours in the graph. Their payoff is the sum of the payoffs
that they obtain from each of the individual bimatrix games.
A mixed strategy for player i is a probability distribution over the m actions of that player,
a strategy profile is a vector s = (s1, s2, . . . , sn) where si is a mixed strategy for player i. The
vector of expected payoffs for player i under strategy profile s is pi(s) :=
∑
(i,j)∈E A
i,jsj . The
expected payoff to player i under s is si ·pi(s). A strategy profile is a mixed Nash equilibrium
if si · pi(s) = maxsi pi(s) for all i, which means that no player can unilaterally change their
strategy in order to obtain a higher expected payoff. In this paper we are interested in the
problem of computing a Nash equilibrium of a tree polymatrix game, which is a polymatrix
game in which the interaction graph is a tree.
Arithmetic circuits. For the purposes of this paper, each gate in an arithmetic circuit
will operate only on values that lie in the range [0, 1]. In our construction, we will use four
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specific gates, called constant introduction denoted by c, bounded addition denoted by +b,
bounded subtraction denoted by −b, and bounded multiplication by a constant denoted by ∗bc.
These gates are formally defined as follows.
c is a gate with no inputs that outputs some fixed constant c ∈ [0, 1].
Given inputs x, y ∈ [0, 1] the gate x+b y := min (x+ y, 1).
Given inputs x, y ∈ [0, 1] the gate x−b y := max (x− y, 0).
Given an input x ∈ [0, 1], and a constant c ≥ 0, the gate x ∗b c := min (x ∗ c, 1).
These gates perform their operation, but also clip the output value so that it lies in the
range [0, 1]. Note that the constant c in the ∗bc gate is specified as part of the gate.
Multiplication of two inputs is not allowed.
We will build arithmetic circuits that compute functions of the form [0, 1]d → [0, 1]d. A
circuit C = (I,G) consists of a set I = {in1, in2, . . . , ind} containing d input nodes, and a set
G = {g1, g2, . . . , gk} containing k gates. Each gate gi has a type from the set {c,+b,−b, ∗bc},
and if the gate has one or more inputs, these are taken from the set I ∪G. The connectivity
structure of the gates is required to be a directed acyclic graph.
The depth of a gate, denoted by d(g) is the length of the longest path from that gate to an
input. We will build synchronous circuits, meaning that all gates of the form gx = gy +b gz
satisfy d(gx) = 1 + d(gy) = 1 + d(gz), and likewise for gates of the form gx = gy −b gz. There
are no restrictions on c-gates, or ∗bc-gates.
The width of a particular level i of the circuit is defined to be w(i) = |{gj : d(gj) = i}|,
which is the number of gates at that level. The width of a circuit is defined to be w(C) =
maxi w(i), which is the maximum width taken over all the levels of the circuit.
Straight line programs. A convenient way of specifying an arithmetic circuit is to write
down a straight line program (SLP) [10].
SLP 1 Example
x ← 0.5
z ← x +b in1
x ← x *b 0.5
out1 ← z +b x
SLP 2 if and for example
x ← in1 *b 1
for i in {1, 2, . . . , 10} do
if i is even then
x ← x +b 0.1
end
end
out1 ← x *b 1
Each line of an SLP consists of a statement of the form v ← op, where v is a variable, and
op consists of exactly one arithmetic operation from the set set {c,+b,−b, ∗bc}. The inputs
to the gate can be any variable that is defined before the line, or one of the inputs to the
circuit. We permit variables to be used on the left hand side in more than one line, which
effectively means that we allow variables to be overwritten.
It is easy to turn an SLP into a circuit. Each line is turned into a gate, and if variable v
is used as the input to gate g, then we set the corresponding input of g to be the gate g′
that corresponds to the line that most recently assigned a value to v. SLP 1 above specifies
a circuit with four gates, and the output of the circuit will be 0.75 +b in1.
For the sake of brevity, we also allow if statements and for loops in our SLPs. These
two pieces of syntax can be thought of as macros that help us specify a straight line program
concisely. The arguments to an if statement or a for loop must be constants that do not
depend on the value of any gate in the circuit. When we turn an SLP into a circuit, we
unroll every for loop the specified number of times, and we resolve every if statement by
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deleting the block if the condition does not hold. So the example above produces a circuit
with seven gates: two gates correspond to the lines x ← in1 *b 1 and out1 ← x *b 1,
while there are five gates corresponding to the line x ← x +b 0.1, since there are five copies
of the line remaining after we unroll the loop and resolve the if statements. The output of
the resulting circuit will be 0.5 +b in1.
Liveness of variables and circuit width. Our ultimate goal will be to build circuits that
have small width. To do this, we can keep track of the number of variables that are live at
any one time in our SLPs. A variable v is live at line i of an SLP if both of the following
conditions are met.
There exists a line with index j ≤ i that assigns a value to v.
There exists a line with index k ≥ i that uses the value assigned to v as an argument.
The number of variables that are live at line i is denoted by live(i), and the number of
variables used by an SLP is defined to be maxi live(i), which is the maximum number of
variables that are live at any point in the SLP. The following is proved in Appendix B.
I Lemma 1. An SLP that uses w variables can be transformed into a polynomial-size
synchronous circuit of width w.
3 Hardness of 2D-Brouwer
In this section, we consider the following problem. It is a variant of two-dimensional Brouwer
that uses only our restricted set of bounded gates.
I Definition 2 (2D-Brouwer). Given an arithmetic circuit F : [0, 1]2 → [0, 1]2 using gates
from the set {c, +b, −b, ∗b c}, find x ∈ [0, 1]2 such that F (x) = x.
As a starting point for our reduction, we will show that this problem is PPAD-hard. Our
proof will follow the work of Mehta [12], who showed that the closely related 2D-LinearFIXP
problem is PPAD-hard. There are two differences between 2D-Brouwer and 2D-LinearFIXP.
In 2D-LinearFIXP, all internal gates of the circuit take and return values from R rather
than [0, 1].
2D-LinearFIXP takes a circuit that uses gates from the set {c,+,−, ∗c,max,min}, where
none of these gates bound their outputs to be in [0, 1].
In this section, we present an altered version of Mehta’s reduction, which will show that
finding an -solution to 2D-Brouwer is PPAD-hard for a constant .
Discrete Brouwer. The starting point for Mehta’s reduction is the two-dimensional
discrete Brouwer problem, which is known to be PPAD-hard [3]. This problem is defined over
a discretization of the unit square [0, 1]2 into a grid of points G = {0, 1/2n, 2/2n, . . . , (2n −
1)/2n}2. The input to the problem is a Boolean circuit C : G→ {1, 2, 3} the assigns one of
three colors to each point. The coloring will respect the following boundary conditions.
We have C(0, i) = 1 for all i.
We have C(i, 0) = 2 for all i > 0.
We have C( 2n−12n , i) = C(i,
2n−1
2n ) = 3 for all i > 0.
These conditions can be enforced syntactically by modifying the circuit. The problem is to
find a grid square that is trichromatic, meaning that all three colors appear on one of the
four points that define the square.
I Definition 3 (DiscreteBrouwer). Given a Boolean circuit C : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}n → {1, 2, 3}
that satisfies the boundary conditions, find a point x, y ∈ {0, 1}n such that, for each color
i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, there exists a point (x′, y′) with C(x′, y′) = i where x′ ∈ {x, x + 1} and
y′ ∈ {y, y + 1}.
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2
3
1
 
︷ ︸︸ ︷
(a) Our stronger boundary conditions.
(−1, 1−√2) ·  (1, 1−√2) · 
(0, 1) · 
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(
√
2−1)·
(b) The mapping from colors to vectors.
Figure 1 Reducing -ThickDisBrouwer to 2D-Brouwer.
Our first deviation from Mehta’s reduction is to insist on the following stronger boundary
condition, which is shown in Figure 1a.
We have C(i, j) = 1 for all i, and for all j ≤ .
We have C(i, j) = 2 for all j > , and for all i ≤ .
We have C(i, j) = C(j, i) = 3 for all i > , and all j ≥ 1− .
The original boundary conditions placed constraints only on the outermost grid points, while
these conditions place constraints on a border of width . We call this modified problem
-ThickDisBrouwer, which is the same as DiscreteBrouwer, except that the function is
syntactically required to satisfy the new boundary conditions.
It is not difficult to produce a polynomial time reduction from DiscreteBrouwer to
-ThickDisBrouwer. It suffices to increase the number of points in the grid, and then to
embed the original DiscreteBrouwer instance into the [, 1− ]2 square in the middle of the
instance. The proof of the following lemma can be found in Appendix C.
I Lemma 4. DiscreteBrouwer can be reduced in polynomial time to -ThickDisBrouwer.
Embedding the grid in [0, 1]2. We now reduce -ThickDisBrouwer to 2D-Brouwer. One
of the keys steps of the reduction is to map points from the continuous space [0, 1]2 to the
discrete grid G. Specifically, given a point x ∈ [0, 1], we would like to determine the n bits
that define the integer bx · 2nc.
Mehta showed that this mapping from continuous points to discrete points can be done
by a linear arithmetic circuit. Here we give a slightly different formulation that uses only
gates from the set {c,+b,−b, ∗bc}. Let L be a fixed constant that will be defined later.
SLP 3 ExtractBit(x, b)
b ← 0.5
b ← x -b b
b ← b *b L
SLP 4 ExtractBits(x, b1, b2, . . . , bn)
for i in {1, 2, . . . , n} do
ExtractBit(x, bi)
y ← bi *b 0.5
x ← x -b y
x ← x *b 2
end
SLP 3 extracts the first bit of the number x ∈ [0, 1]. The first three lines of the program
compute the value b = (x−b 0.5) ∗b L. There are three possibilities.
If x ≤ 0.5, then b = 0.
If x ≥ 0.5 + 1/L, then b = 1.
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If 0.5 < x < 0.5 + 1/L, then b will be some number strictly between 0 and 1.
The first two cases correctly decode the first bit of x, and we call these cases good decodes.
We will call the third case a bad decode, since the bit has not been decoded correctly.
SLP 4 extracts the first n bits of x, by extracting each bit in turn, starting with the first
bit. The three lines after each extraction erase the current first bit of x, and then multiply x
by two, which means that the next extraction will give us the next bit of x. If any of the
bit decodes are bad, then this procedure will break, meaning that we only extract the first
n bits of x in the case where all decodes are good. We say that x is well-positioned if the
procedure succeeds, and poorly-positioned otherwise.
Multiple samples. The problem of poorly-positioned points is common in PPAD-hardness
reductions. Indeed, observe that we cannot define an SLP that always correctly extracts
the first n bits of x, since this would be a discontinuous function, and all gates in our
arithmetic circuits compute continuous functions. As in previous works, this is resolved
by taking multiple samples around a given point. Specifically, for the point p ∈ [0, 1]2, we
sample k points p1, p2, . . . , pk where pi = p+ (i− 1)
(
1
(k+1)·2n+1 ,
1
(k+1)·2n+1
)
. Mehta proved
that there exists a setting for L that ensures that there are at most two points that have
poorly positioned coordinates. We have changed several details, and so we provide our own
statement and proof here. The proof can be found in Appendix D.
I Lemma 5. If L = (k + 2) · 2n+1, then at most two of the points p1 through pk have
poorly-positioned coordinates.
Evaluating a Boolean circuit. Once we have decoded the bits for a well-positioned point,
we have a sequence of 0/1 variables. It is easy to simulate a Boolean circuit on these values.
The operator ¬ x can be simulated by 1−b x.
The operator x ∨ y can be simulated by x+b y.
The operator x ∧ y can be simulated by applying De Morgan’s laws and using ∨ and ¬.
Recall that C outputs one of three possible colors. We also assume, without loss of generality,
that C gives its output as a one-hot vector. This means that there are three Boolean outputs
x1, x2, x3 ∈ {0, 1}3 of the circuit. The color 1 is represented by the vector (1, 0, 0), the color
2 is represented as (0, 1, 0), and color 3 is represented as (0, 0, 1). If the simulation is applied
to a point with well-positioned coordinates, then the circuit will output one of these three
vectors, while if it is applied to a point with poorly positioned coordinates, then the circuit
will output some value x ∈ [0, 1]3 that has no particular meaning.
The output. The key idea behind the reduction is that each color will be mapped to a
displacement vector, as shown in Figure 1b. Here we again deviate from Mehta’s reduction,
by giving different vectors that will allow us to prove our approximation lower bound.
Color 1 will be mapped to the vector (0, 1) · .
Color 2 will be mapped to the vector (1, 1−√2) · .
Color 3 will be mapped to the vector (−1, 1−√2) · .
These are irrational coordinates, but in our proofs we argue that a suitably good rational
approximation of these vectors will suffice. We average the displacements over the k different
sampled points to get the final output of the circuit. Suppose that xij denotes output i from
sampled point j. Our circuit will compute
dispx =
k∑
j=1
(x2j − x3j) · 
k
, dispy =
k∑
j=1
(
x1j + (1−
√
2)(x2j + x3j)
) · 
k
.
Finally, we specify F : [0, 1]2 → [0, 1]2 to compute F (x, y) = (x+ dispx · , y + dispy · ).
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Completing the proof. To find an approximate fixed point of F , we must find a point
where both dispx and dispy are close to zero. The dotted square in Figure 1b shows the
set of displacements that satisfy ‖x − (0, 0)‖∞ ≤ (
√
2 − 1) · , which correspond to the
displacements that would be (
√
2− 1) · -fixed points.
The idea is that, if we do not sample points of all three colors, then we cannot produce a
displacement that is strictly better than an (
√
2− 1) · -fixed point. For example, if we only
have points of colors 1 and 2, then the displacement will be some point on the dashed line
between the red and blue vectors in Figure 1b. This line touches the box of (
√
2− 1) · -fixed
points, but does not enter it. It can be seen that the same property holds for the other pairs
of colors: we specifically chose the displacement vectors in order to maximize the size of the
inscribed square shown in Figure 1b.
The argument is complicated by the fact that two of our sampled points may have poorly
positioned coordinates, which may drag the displacement towards (0, 0). However, this effect
can be minimized by taking a large number of samples. We show show the following lemma.
I Lemma 6. Let ′ < (
√
2− 1) ·  be a constant. There is a sufficiently large constant k such
that, if ‖x− F (x)‖∞ < ′, then x is contained in a trichromatic square.
The proof of Lemma 6 can be found in Appendix E. Since  can be fixed to be any
constant strictly less than 0.5, we obtain the following.
I Theorem 7. Given a 2D-Brouwer instance, it is PPAD-hard to find a point x ∈ [0, 1]2 s.t.
‖x− F (x)‖∞ < (
√
2− 1)/2 ≈ 0.2071.
Reducing 2D-Brouwer to 2D-LinearFIXP is easy, since the gates {c,+b,−b, ∗bc} can be
simulated by the gates {c,+,−, ∗c,max,min}. This implies that it is PPAD-hard to find an
-fixed point of a 2D-LinearFIXP instance with  < (
√
2− 1)/2.
It should be noted that an -approximate fixed point can be found in polynomial time if
the function has a suitably small Lipschitz constant, by trying all points in a grid of width .
We are able to obtain a lower bound for constant  because our functions have exponentially
large Lipschitz constants.
4 Hardness of 2D-Brouwer with a constant width circuit
In our reduction from 2D-Brouwer to tree polymatrix games, the number of actions in the
game will be determined by the width of the circuit. This means that the hardness proof
from the previous section is not a sufficient starting point, because it produces 2D-Brouwer
instances that have circuits with high width. In particular, the circuits will extract 2n bits
from the two inputs, which means that the circuits will have width at least 2n.
Since we desire a constant number of actions in our tree polymatrix game, we need to
build a hardness proof for 2D-Brouwer that produces a circuit with constant width. In this
section we do exactly that, by reimplementing the reduction from the previous section using
gadgets that keep the width small.
Bit packing. We adopt an idea of Elkind, Goldberg, and Goldberg [9], to store many bits
in a single arithmetic value using a packed representation. Given bits b1, b2, . . . , bk ∈ {0, 1},
the packed representation of these bits is the value packed(b1, b2, . . . , bk) :=
∑k
i=1 bi/2i. We
will show that the reduction from the previous section can be performed while keeping all
Boolean values in a single variable that uses packed representation.
Working with packed variables. We build SLPs that work with this packed representation,
two of which are shown below.
A. Deligkas, J. Fearnley, and R. Savani XX:9
SLP 5 FirstBit(x, b) +0 variables
// Extract the first bit of x
into b
b ← 0.5
b ← x -b b
b ← b *b L
// Remove the first bit of x
b ← b *b 0.5
x ← x -b b
x ← x *b 2
b ← b *b 2
SLP 6 Clear(I, x) +2 variables
x’ ← x *b 1
for i in {1, 2, . . . , k} do
b ← 0
FirstBit(x’, b)
if i ∈ I then
b ← b *b 12i
x ← x -b b
end
end
The FirstBit SLP combines the ideas from SLPs 3 and 4 to extract the first bit from a
value x ∈ [0, 1]. Repeatedly applying this SLP allows us to read out each bit of a value in
sequence. The Clear SLP uses this to set some bits of a packed variable to zero. It takes as
input a set of indices I, and a packed variable x = packed(b1, b2, . . . , bk). At the end of the
SLP we have x = packed(b′1, b′2, . . . , b′k) where b′i = 0 whenever i ∈ I, and b′i = bi otherwise.
It first copies x to a fresh variable x′. The bits of x′ are then read-out using FirstBit.
Whenever a bit bi with i ∈ I is decoded from x′, we subtract bi/2i from x. If bi = 1, then
this sets the corresponding bit of x to zero, and if bi = 0, then this leaves x unchanged.
We want to minimize the the width of the circuit that we produce, so we keep track of
the number of extra variables used by our SLPs. For FirstBit, this is zero, while for clear
this is two, since that SLP uses the fresh variables x′ and b.
Packing and unpacking bits. We implement two SLPs that manipulated packed variables.
The Pack(x, y, S) operation allows us to extract bits from y ∈ [0, 1], and store them in
x, while the Unpack(x, y, S) operation allows us to extract bits from x to create a value
y ∈ [0, 1]. This is formally specified in the following lemma, which is proved in Appendix F.
I Lemma 8. Suppose that we are given x = packed(b1, b2, . . . , bk), a variable y ∈ [0, 1], and
a sequence of indices S = 〈s1, s2, . . . , sj〉. Let yj denote the jth bit of y. The following SLPs
can be implemented using at most two extra variables.
Pack(x, y, S) modifies x so that x = packed(b′1, b′2, . . . , b′k) where b′i = yj whenever
there exists an index sj ∈ S with sj = i, and b′i = bi otherwise.
Unpack(x, y, S) modifies y so that y = y +b
∑j
i=1 bsi/2i
Simulating a Boolean operations. As described in the previous section, the reduction
only needs to simulate or- and not-gates. Given x = packed(b1, b2, . . . , bk), and three indices
i1, i2, i3, we implement two SLPs, which both modify x so that x = packed(b′1, b′2, . . . , b′k).
SLP 7 implements Or(x, i1, i2, i3), which ensures that b′i3 = bi1 ∨ bi2 , and b′i = bi for i 6= i3.
SLP 8 implements Not(x, i1, i2), which ensures that b′i2 = ¬bi1 , and b′i = bi for i 6= i2.
These two SLPs simply unpack the input bits, perform the operation, and then pack
the result into the output bit. The Or SLP uses the Unpack operation to set a = bi1 +b bi2 .
Both SLPs use three extra variables: the fresh variable a is live throughout, and the pack
and unpack operations use two extra variables. The variable b in the Not SLP is not live
concurrently with a pack or unpack, and so does not increase the number of live variables.
These two SLPs can be used to simulate a Boolean circuit using at most three extra variables.
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SLP 7 Or(x, i1, i2, i3) +3 vari-
ables
a ← 0
Unpack(x, a, 〈i1〉)
Unpack(x, a, 〈i2〉)
Pack(x, a, 〈i3〉)
SLP 8 Not(x, i1, i2) +3 vari-
ables
a ← 0
Unpack(x, a, 〈i1〉)
b ← 1
a ← b -b a
Pack(x, a, 〈i2〉)
I Lemma 9. Let C be a Boolean circuit with n inputs and k gates. Suppose that x =
packed(b1, . . . , bn), gives values for the inputs of the circuit. There is an SLP Simulate(C, x)
that uses three extra variables, and modifies x so that x = packed(b1, . . . , bn, bn+1, . . . , bn+k),
where bn+i is the output of gate i of the circuit.
Implementing the reduction. Finally, we can show that the circuit built in Theorem 7
can be implemented by an SLP that uses at most 8 variables. This SLP cycles through each
sampled point in turn, computes the x and y displacements by simulating the Boolean circuit,
and then adds the result to the output. The following theorem is proved in Appendix H
I Theorem 10. Given a 2D-Brouwer instance, it is PPAD-hard to find a point x ∈ [0, 1]2
with ‖x− F (x)‖∞ <
√
2−1
2 even for a synchronous circuit of width eight.
5 Hardness for tree polymatrix games
Now we show that finding a Nash equilibrium of a tree polymatrix game is PPAD-hard. We
reduce from the low-width 2D-Brouwer problem, whose hardness was shown in Theorem 10.
Throughout this section, we suppose that we have a 2D-Brouwer instance defined by a
synchronous arithmetic circuit F of width eight and depth n. The gates of this circuit will be
indexed as gi,j where 1 ≤ i ≤ 8 and 1 ≤ j ≤ n, meaning that gi,j is the ith gate on level j.
Modifying the circuit. The first step of the reduction is to modify the circuit. First,
we modify the circuit so that all gates operate on values in [0, 0.1], rather than [0, 1]. We
introduce the operators +b0.1, −b0.1, and ∗b0.1, which bound their outputs to be in [0, 0.1]. The
following lemma, proved in Appendix I, states that we can rewrite our circuit using these
new gates. The transformation simply divides all c-gates in the circuit by ten.
I Lemma 11. Given an arithmetic circuit F : [0, 1]2 → [0, 1]2 that uses gates from
{c,+b,−b, ∗b}, we can construct a circuit F ′ : [0, 0.1]2 → [0, 0.1]2 that uses the gates from
{c,+b0.1,−b0.1, ∗b0.1}, so that F (x, y) = (x, y) if and only if F ′(x/10, y/10) = (x/10, y/10).
Next we modify the structure of the circuit by connecting the two outputs of the circuit
to its two inputs. Suppose, without loss of generality, that g7,1 and g8,1 are the inputs and
that g7,n and g8,n are outputs. Note that the equality x = y can be implemented using the
gate x = y ∗b0.1 1. We add the following extra equalities, which are shown in Figure 2.
We add gates g9,n−1 = g7,n and g10,n−1 = g8,n.
For each j in the range 2 ≤ j < n− 1, we add g9,j = g9,j+1 and g10,j = g10,j+1.
We modify g7,1 so that g7,1 = g9,2, and we modify g8,1 so that g8,1 = g10,2.
Note that these gates are backwards: they copy values from higher levels in the circuit to
lower levels, and so the result is not a circuit, but a system of constraints defined by gates,
with some structural properties. Firstly, each gate gi,j is only involved in constraints with
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g1,1 g1,2 · · · g1,7 g1,8 g1,9 g1,10
g2,1 g2,2 · · · g2,7 g2,8 g2,9 g2,10
...
...
...
...
...
...
gn,1 gn,2 gn,7 gn,8 gn,9 gn,10· · ·
Figure 2 Extra equalities to introduce feedback of g7,n and g8,n to g7,1 and g8,1 respectively.
v1
m1
c1
m2
v2
m3
c2
m4
v3
m5
. . . vn
m2n−1
Figure 3 The structure of the polymatrix game.
gates of the form gi′,j+1 and gi′,j−1. Secondly, finding values for the gates that satisfy all of
the constraints is PPAD-hard, since by construction such values would yield a fixed point of F .
The polymatrix game. The polymatrix game will contain three types of players.
For each i = 1, . . . , n, we have a variable player vi.
For each i = 1, . . . , n− 1, we have a constraint player ci, who is connected to vi and vi+1.
For each i = 1, . . . , 2n− 1, we have a mix player mi. If i is even, then mi is connected
to ci/2. If i is odd, then mi is connected to v(i+1)/2.
The structure of this game is shown in Figure 3. Each player has twenty actions, which are
divided into ten pairs, xi and x¯i for i = 1, . . . , 10.
Forcing mixing. The role of the mix players is to force the variable and constraint
players to play specific mixed strategies: for every variable or constraint player j, we want
sj(xi) + sj(x¯i) = 0.1 for all i, which means that the same amount of probability is assigned
to each pair of actions. To force this, each mix player plays a high-stakes hide-and-seek
against their opponent, which is shown in Figure 4. This zero-sum game is defined by a
20× 20 matrix Z and a constant M . The payoff Zij is defined as follows. If i ∈ {xa, x¯a} and
j ∈ {xa, x¯a} for some a, then Zij = M . Otherwise, Zij = 0. For each i the player mi plays
XX:12 Tree Polymatrix Games are PPAD-hard
M
−M
M
−M
M
−M
M
−M
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
M
−M
M
−M
M
−M
M
−M
x¯1
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x¯1 x1 x¯2 x2
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ci/2
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· · ·
. . .
0
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0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
M
−M
M
−M
M
−M
M
−M
x¯20
x20
x¯20 x20
Figure 4 The hide and seek game that forces cj/2 to play an appropriate mixed strategy. The
same game is used to force v(j−1)/2 mixes appropriately.
against player j, which is either a constraint player ci′ or a variable player vi′ . We define
the payoff matrix Ami,j = Z and Gj,mi = −Z. The following lemma, proved in Appendix J,
shows that if M is suitably large, then the variable and constraint players must allocate
probability 0.1 to each of the ten action pairs.
I Lemma 12. Suppose that all payoffs in the games between variable and constraint players
use payoffs in the range [−P, P ]. If M > 40 · P then in every mixed Nash equilibrium s, the
action sj of every variable and constraint player j satisfies sj(xi) + sj(x¯i) = 0.1 for all i.
Gate gadgets. We now define the payoffs for variable and constraint players. Actions xi
and x¯i of variable player vj will represent the output of gate gi,j . Specifically, the probability
that player vj assigns to action xi will be equal to the output of gi,j . In this way, the strategy
of variable player vj will represent the output of every gate at level j of the circuit. The
constraint player cj enforces all constraints between the gates at level j and the gates at
level j + 1. To simulate each gate, we will embed one of the gate gadgets from Figure 5,
which originated from the reduction of DGP [5], into the bimatrix games that involve cj .
The idea is that, for the constraint player to be in equilibrium, the variable players must
play xi with probabilities that exactly simulate the original gate. Lemma 12 allows us to
treat each gate independently: each pair of actions xi and si must receive probability 0.1 in
total, but the split of probability between xi and si is determined by the gate gadgets.
Formally, we construct the payoff matrices Avi,ci and Aci,vi+1 for all i < n by first setting
each payoff to 0. Then, for each gate, we embed the corresponding gate gadget from Figure 5
into the matrices. For each gate ga,j , we take the corresponding game from Figure 5, and
embed it into the rows xa and x¯a of a constraint player’s matrix. The diagrams specify
specific actions of the constraint and variable players that should be modified.
For gates that originated in the circuit, the gadget is always embedded into the matrices
Avj−1,cj−1 and Acj−1,vj , the synchronicity of the circuit ensures that the inputs for level
j gates come from level j − 1 gates. We have also added extra multiplication gates that
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1
0
1
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0
x¯i
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x¯i xi
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vj
gi,j = c
Figure 5 DGP polymatrix game gadgets.
copy values from the output of the circuit back to the input. These gates are of the form
gi,j = gi′,j+1, and are embedded into the matrices Avj ,cj and Acj ,vj+1 .
The following lemma, proved in Appendix 13, states that, in every Nash equilibrium, the
strategies of the variable players exactly simulate the gates that have been embedded.
I Lemma 13. In every mixed Nash equilibrium s of the game, the following are satisfied for
each gate gi,j.
If gi,j = c, then svj (xi) = c.
If gi,j = gi1,j−1 +b0.1 gi2,j−1, then svj (xi) = svj−1(xi1) +b0.1 svj−1(xi2).
If gi,j = gi1,j−1 −b0.1 gi2,j−1, then svj (xi) = svj−1(xi1) −b0.1 svj−1(xi2).
If gi,j = gi1,j′ ∗b0.1 c, then svj (xi) = svj′ (xi1) ∗b0.1 c.
Lemma 13 says that, in every Nash equilibrium of the game, the strategies of the variable
players exactly simulate the gates, which by construction means that they give us a fixed
point of the circuit F . Also note that it is straightforward to give a path decomposition for
our interaction graph, where each node in the decomposition contains exactly two vertices
from the game, meaning that the graph has pathwidth 1. So we have proved the following.
I Theorem 14. It is PPAD-hard to find a Nash equilibrium of a tree polymatrix game, even
when all players have at most twenty actions and the interaction graph has pathwidth 1.
6 Open questions
For polymatrix games, the main open question is to find the exact boundary between
tractability and hardness. Twenty-action pathwidth-1 tree polymatrix games are hard,
but two-action path polymatrix games can be solved in polynomial time [9]. What about
two-action tree polymatrix games, or path-polymatrix games with more than two actions?
For 2D-Brouwer and 2D-LinearFIXP, the natural question is: for which  is it hard to
find an -fixed point? We have shown that it is hard for  = 0.2071, while the case for  = 0.5
is trivial, since the point (0.5, 0.5) must always be a 0.5-fixed point. Closing the gap between
these two numbers would be desirable.
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A An issue with the lower bound in [9]
This section refers to the result in [9], which purports to show that finding a Nash equilibrium
in a graphical game of pathwidth four is PPAD-hard. Like this paper, their proof reduces from
discrete Brouwer, but unlike this paper and other work [4,5,12,15], the proof attempts to
carry out the reduction entirely using Boolean values. In other words, there is no step (like
Lemmas 4 and 5 in this paper), where the Boolean outputs of the circuit are converted to
arithmetic values. In all reductions of this type, this is carried out by averaging over multiple
copies of the circuit, with the understanding that some of the circuits may give nonsensical
outputs.
It is difficult to see how a reduction that avoids this step could work. This is because
the expected payoff for a player in a polymatrix game is a continuous function of the other
player’s strategies. But attempting to reduce directly from a Boolean circuit would produce
a function that is discontinuous.
It seems very likely that the proof in [9] can be repaired by including an explicit averaging
step, and it this may still result in a graph that has bounded pathwidth, though it is less
clear that the pathwidth would still be four. On the other hand, our work makes this less
pressing, since the repaired result would still be subsumed by our lower bound for polymatrix
games with pathwidth one.
B Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. The idea is to make each level of the circuit correspond to a line of the SLP. We
assume that all for loops have been unrolled, and that all if statements have been resolved.
Suppose that the resulting SLP has k lines, and furthermore assume that at each line of the
SLP, we have an indexed list v1, v2, . . . , vl of the variables that are live on each line, where
of course we have l ≤ w.
We will build a circuit with k ·w gates, and will index those gates as gi,j , where 1 ≤ i ≤ k
is a line, and 1 ≤ j ≤ w is a variable. The idea is that the gate gi,j will compute the value of
the jth live variable on line i. The gate gi,j will be constructed as follows.
If there are fewer than j variables live at line k of the SLP, then gi,j is a dummy c-gate.
If line i of the SLP is vj ← op, then we define gi,j = op. If op uses a variable x as an
input, then by definition, this variable must be live on line i− 1, and so we find the index
j′ for x on line i− 1, and we substitute gi−1,j′ for x in op. We do this for both arguments
in the case where op is +b or −b.
If line i of the SLP does not assign a value to vj , then by definition, the variable must be
live on line i− 1. As before, let j′ be the index of this variable on line i− 1. We define
gi,j = gi−1,j′ ∗b 1.
It is not difficult to see that this circuit exactly simulates the SLP. Moreover, by construction,
we have d(gi,j) = i. Hence, each level of the circuit has width exactly w, and so the overall
width of the circuit is w.
J
C Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. Suppose that we are given a DiscreteBrouwer instance defined by a circuit C
over the grid Gn = {0, 1/2n, 2/2n, . . . , (2n − 1)/2n}2. Let n′ be an integer such that
2n/2n′ < (1 − 2). We will build an -ThickDisBrouwer instance defined by a circuit C ′
over the grid Gn′ = {0, 1/2n′ , 2/2n′ , . . . , (2n′ − 1)/2n′}2. We will embed the original instance
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in the center of the new instance, where the point (x0, y0) = (0.5− 2n−1/2n′ , 0.5− 2n−1/2n′)
in G′ will correspond to the point (0, 0) in G. We use the following procedure to determine
the color of a point (x, y) ∈ Gn′ .
1. If 0 ≤ x− x0 ≤ 2n and 0 ≤ y − y0 ≤ 2n, then C ′(x, y) = C(x− x0, y − y0).
2. Otherwise, if x− x0 < 0, then C(x, y) = 1.
3. Otherwise, if y − y0 ≤ 0, then C(x, y) = 2.
4. Otherwise, C(x, y) = 3.
Observe that
x0 = 0.5− 2
n−1
2n′ > 0.5−
(1− 2)
2 = ,
where the second inequality used the definition of n′. Moreover
x0 + 2n = 0.5 +
2n−1
2n′ < 0.5 +
(1− 2)
2 = 1− ,
where again the second inequality used the definition of n′. The same inequalities hold for
y0. Hence, the first step of our procedure perfectly embeds the original instance into the
new instance, while the other steps ensure that the -ThickDisBrouwer boundary conditions
hold.
Points in the boundary cannot be solutions, because the boundary constraints ensure
that at least one of the three colors will be missing. Hence, every solution of C ′ on G′ must
also be a solution of C on G. J
D Proof of Lemma 5
Proof. Observe that SLP 3 produces a bad decode if and only if x is in the range [0.5, 0.5 +
1/L). Since SLP 4 extracts n bits, multiplying x by two each time, it follows that one of the
decodes will fail if
x ∈ I(a) =
[
a
2n ,
a
2n +
1
L
)
,
for some integer a.
Hence, the point pi = (p1i , p2i ) has a poorly-positioned coordinate if there is some integer a
such that p1i ∈ I(a), or p2i ∈ I(a). For a fixed dimension j ∈ {1, 2}, we have two properties.
There cannot be two points pi and pi′ such that pji and p
j
i′ both lie in the same interval
I(a). This is because the width of the interval is
1
L
= 1(k + 2) · 2n+1 <
1
(k + 1) · 2n+1 ,
where the final term is the defined difference between pji and p
j
i+1.
There cannot be two distinct indices a and a′ such that pji ∈ I(a) and pji′ ∈ I(a′). This is
because the distance between pj1 and p
j
k is at most
k · 1(k + 1) · 2n+1 <
1
2n+1 ,
whereas the distance between any two consecutive intervals I(a) and I(a+ 1) is at least
a+ 1
2n −
(
a
2n +
1
(k + 2) · 2n+1
)
= 12n −
1
(k + 2) · 2n+1 >
1
2n+1 .
From these two facts, it follows that there is at most one point that has a poorly-positioned
coordinate in dimension j, so there can be at most two points that have poorly positioned
coordinates. J
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E Proof of Lemma 6
Proof. We argue that if ‖x − F (x)‖∞ < ′/2, then there exist three indices i1, i2, and i3
such that pij has well-positioned coordinates, and that the lower-left corner of the square
containing pij has color j.
Suppose for the sake of contradiction that this is not true. Then there must be a color
that is missing, and there are two cases to consider.
1. First suppose that color 1 is missing. Since there are at most two points with poorly-
positioned coordinates, we know that we have at least k− 2 points j for which x2j = 1 or
x3j = 1. Hence we have
dispy ≤
(
(1−√2)(k − 2)
k
+ 2
k
)
· ,
where the 2/k term comes from the fact that the poorly positioned points can maximize
dispy by fixing x1j = 1 and x2j = x3j = 0, and thus can contribute at most 2 · /k to
the sum.
As k tends to infinity, the right-hand side converges to (1−√2) · . Since ′ < , we can
choose a sufficiently large constant k such that dispy < (1 −
√
2) · ′. Now, observing
that 1−√2 is negative, we get the following
‖x− F (x)‖∞ >
∣∣∣(1−√2) · ′∣∣∣ = (√2− 1) · ′,
giving our contradiction.
2. Now suppose that one of colors 2 or 3 is missing. We will consider the case where color 3
is missing, as the other case is symmetric. As before, since there are at most two points
with poorly-positioned coordinates, we know that we have at least k − 2 points j for
which x1j = 1 or x2j = 1. One of the two following cases applies.
a. At least (
√
2− 1) · k − 2 well-positioned points satisfy x2j = 1. If this is the case, then
we have
dispx ≥
(
(
√
2− 1) · k − 2
k
− 2
k
)
· ,
where we have used the fact that there are no well positioned points with color 3, and
the fact that the poorly-positioned points cannot reduce the sum by more than 2·k .
As k tends to infinity, the right-hand side tends to (
√
2− 1) · , so there is a sufficiently
large constant k such that dispx > (
√
2− 1) · ′, and so ‖x− F (X)‖∞ > (
√
2− 1) · ′.
b. At least k − (√2− 1) · k well-positioned points satisfy x1j = 1. In this case we have
dispy ≥
k∑
j=1
(
x1j − (
√
2− 1)x2j
k
− 2
k
)
· 
≥

(
k − (√2− 1) · k
)
−
(
(
√
2− 1)(√2− 1) · k
)
k
− 2
k
 · 
=
(
(
√
2− 1) · k
k
− 2
k
)
· .
The first line of this inequality uses the fact that we have no well-positioned points
with color 3, and that the poorly-positioned points can reduce the sum by at most 2·k .
XX:18 Tree Polymatrix Games are PPAD-hard
The second line substitutes the bounds that we have for x1j and x2j . The third line
uses the fact that
√
2− 1 is a solution of the equation x = 1− x− x2.
As in the other two cases, this means that we can choose a sufficiently large constant
k such that ‖x− F (X)‖∞ > (
√
2− 1) · ′.
Next we observe that the arguments given above all continue to hold if we substitute
a sufficiently precise rational approximation
√
2 in our displacement vector calculation.
This is because all three arguments prove that some expression converges to (
√
2− 1) ·  >
(
√
2− 1) · ′, thus we can replace √2 with any suitably close rational that ensures that
the expressions converge to (x− 1) ·  > (√2− 1) · ′ for some x.
So far we have shown that there exist three well-positioned points pi1 , pi2 , and pi3 that
have three distinct colors. To see that x is contained within a trichromatic square, it
suffices to observe that ‖pk − p1‖∞ ≤ 1/2k, which means that all three points must be
contained in squares that are adjacent to the square containing x.
J
F Proof of Lemma 8
We construct SLPs for both of the operations.
Packing bits. The Pack operation is implemented by the following SLP.
SLP 9 Pack(x, y, S) +2 variables
Clear(S, x)
y’ ← y *b 1
for i in {1, 2, . . . , j} do
b ← 0
FirstBit(y’, b)
x ← b *b 12si
end
SLP 9 implements the pack operation. It begins by clearing the bits referenced by the
sequence S. It then copies y to y’, and destructively extracts the first j bits of y’. These
bits are then stored at the correct index in x by the final line of the for loop. In total, this
SLP uses two additional variables y’ and b. Two extra variables are used by Clear, but
these stop being live after the first line, before y’ and b become live.
Unpacking bits. The Unpack operation is implemented by the following SLP.
SLP 10 Unpack(x, y, S) +2 variables
x’ ← x *b 1
for i in {1, 2, . . . , k} do
b ← 0
FirstBit(x’, b)
if i = sj for some j then
b ← b *b 12sj
y ← y +b b
end
end
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SLP 10 implements the unpacking operation. It first copies x to x’, and then destructively
extracts the first k bits of x’. Whenever a bit referred to by S is extracted from x’, it is
first multiplied by 12sj , which puts it at the correct position, and is then added to y. This
SLP uses the two additional variables x’ and b.
G Proof of Lemma 9
Simulating a Boolean circuit. Let 〈gn+1, gn+2, . . . , gn+k〉 be the gates of the circuit, and
suppose, without loss of generality, that the gates have been topologically ordered. The
following SLP will simulate the circuit C.
SLP 11 Simulate(C, x) +3 variables
for i in {n+ 1, n+ 2, . . . , n+ k} do
if gi = gj1 ∨ gj2 then
Or(x, i, j1, j2)
end
if gi = ¬gj then
Not(x, i, j)
end
end
Assuming that the first n bits of x already contain the packed inputs of the circuit, SLP 11
implements the operation Simulate(C, x) that computes the output of each gate. This simply
iterates through and simulates each gate. The SLP introduce no new variables, and so it
uses three additional live variables in total, which come from the Or and Not operations.
H Proof of Theorem 10
Dealing with the output. Recall that our Boolean circuit will output three bits, and that
these bits determine which displacement vector is added to the output of the arithmetic circuit.
We now build an SLP that does this conversion. It implements AddVector(x, i, outx, outy, k, dx, dy),
where x = packed(b1, b2, . . . , bn), i ≤ n is an index, outx and outy are variables, k is an
integer, and dx, dy ∈ [−1, 1]. After this procedure, we should have outx = outx + dx · bi/k,
and outy = outy + dy · bi/k. SLP 12 does this operation. It uses three extra variables in
total: the fresh variable a is live throughout, and the two unpack operations use two extra
variables.
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SLP 12 AddVector(x, i, outx, outy, dx, dy, k) +3
variables
// Add dx · bi to outx
a ← 0
Unpack(x, a, 〈i〉)
a ← |dx|/k *b a
outx ← outx +b a // Use -b if dx < 0
// Add dy · bi to outy
a ← 0
Unpack(x, a, 〈i〉)
a ← |dy|/k *b a
outy ← outy +b a // Use -b if dy < 0
Implementing the reduction. Finally, we can implement the reduction from DiscreteBrouwer
to 2D-Brouwer. We will assume that we have been given a Boolean circuit C that takes 2n
inputs, where the first n input bits correspond to the x coordinate, and the second n input
bits correspond to the y coordinate. Recall that we have required that C gives its output as
a one-hot vector. We assume that the three output bits of C are indexed n+ k− 2, n+ k− 1,
and n+ k, corresponding to colors 1, 2, and 3, respectively.
SLP 13 Reduction(inx, iny, outx, outy) +4 variables
outx ← inx
outy ← iny
for i in {1, 2, . . . , k} do
inx ← inx +b 1/((k + 1) · 2n+1)
iny ← iny +b 1/((k + 1) · 2n+1)
x ← 0
Pack(x, inx, 〈1, 2, . . . , n〉)
Pack(x, iny, 〈n + 1, n + 2, . . . , 2n〉)
Simulate(C, x)
AddVector(x, n+k-2, outx, outy, k, 0, 1)
AddVector(x, n+k-1, outx, outy, k, 1,
1-
√
2)
AddVector(x, n+k , outx, outy, k, -1,
1-
√
2)
end
SLP 13 implements the reduction. The variables inx and iny hold the inputs to the circuit,
while the variables outx and outy are the outputs. The SLP first copies the inputs to the
outputs, and then modifies the outputs using the displacement vectors. Each iteration of the
for loop computes the computes the displacement contributed by the point pi (defined in
the previous section). This involves decoding the first n bits of both inx and iny, which can
be done via the pack operation, simulating the circuit on the resulting bits, and then adding
the correct displacement vectors to outx and outy.
The correctness of this SLP follows from our correctness proof for Theorem 7, since all
we have done in this section is reimplement while using a small number of live variables. In
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total, this SLP uses four extra variables. All of the macros use at most three extra variables,
and the fresh variable x during these macros. Since inx iny, outx and outy are all live
throughout as well, this gives us 8 live variables in total.
I Proof of Lemma 11
Proof. The circuit F ′ consists of gates g′i,j for each 1 ≤ i ≤ 8 and 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
If gi,j = c, then g′i,j = c/10.
If gi,j = ga,b +b gx,y, then g′i,j = g′a,b +b0.1 g′x,y.
If gi,j = ga,b −b gx,y, then g′i,j = g′a,b −b0.1 g′x,y.
If gi,j = ga,b ∗b c, then g′i,j = g′a,b ∗b0.1 c.
Let (x, y) ∈ [0, 1]2. It is not difficult to show by induction, that if we compute F (x, y) and
F ′(x/10, y/10), then g′i,j = gi,j/10 for all i and j. Hence, F (x, y) = (x, y) if and only if
F ′(x/10, y/10) = (x/10, y/10). J
J Proof of Lemma 12
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, suppose that there is a Nash equilibrium s in which
there is some variable or constraint player j that fails to satisfy this equality. Let I be the
subset of indices that maximize the expression sj(xi) + sj(x¯i), ie., I contains the pairs that
player j plays with highest probability. Note that since player j does not play all pairs
uniformly, I does not contain every index, so let J be the non-empty set of indices not in I.
Let mk be the mix player who plays against player j. By construction, the actions xi
and x¯i have payoff (sj(xi) + sj(x¯i)) ·M for mk. Since s is a Nash equilibrium, mk may only
place probability on actions that are best responses, which means that he may only place
probability on the actions xi and x¯i when i ∈ I.
Let i be an index that maximizes smk(xi)+smk(x¯i) for playermk. By the above argument,
we have i ∈ I. The actions xi and x¯i for player j give payoff at most
2P −M · (smk(xi) + smk(x¯i)) ≤ 2P −M/10
< −2P.
The first expression uses 2P as the maximum possible payoff that player j can obtain from
the two other games in which he is involved. The first inequality uses the fact that i was the
pair with maximal probability, and there are exactly 10 pairs. The second inequality uses
the fact that M/10 > 4P .
On the other hand, let i′ be an index in J . By the argument above, we have smk(xi′) +
smk(x¯i′) = 0. Hence, the payoff of actions xi′ and x¯i′ to player j is at least −2P , since that
is the lowest payoff that he can obtain from the other two games in which he is involved.
But now we have arrived at our contradiction. Player j places non-zero probability on at
least one action xi or x¯i with i ∈ I that is not a pure best response. Hence s cannot be a
Nash equilibrium. J
K Proof of Lemma 13
Proof. We can actually prove this lemma for all four gates simultaneously. Let j′ be the
index constraint player into which the gate gadget is embedded. Observe that all four games
for the four gate types have a similar structure: The payoffs for actions xi and x¯i for player
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vj are identical across all four games, and the payoff of action xi for cj′ are also identical;
the only thing that differs between the gates is the payoff to player cj′ for action x¯i. We
describe these differences using a function f .
For c-gates, we define f(s) = c.
For +b0.1-gates, we define f(s) = svj−1(xi1) + svj−1(xi1).
For −b0.1-gates, we define f(s) = svj−1(xi1) − svj−1(xi1).
For ∗b0.1-gates, we define f(s) = svj′ (xi1) ∗ c.
Observe that the payoff of action x¯i to player cj′ is f(s). To prove the lemma, we must show
that player vj plays xi with probability
min(max(f(s), 0.1), 0).
There are three cases to consider.
If f(s) ≤ 0, then we argue that svj (xi) = 0. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that
player vj places non-zero probability on action xi. Then action xi for player cj′ will have
payoff strictly greater than zero, whereas action x¯i will have payoff f(s) ≤ 0. Hence, in
equilibrium, cj′ cannot play action x¯i. Lemma 12 then implies that player cj′ must play
xi with probability 0.1. If cj′ does this, then the payoff to vj for xi will be zero, and
the payoff to vj for x¯i will be 0.1. This means that vj places non-zero probability on an
action that is not a best response, and so is a contradiction.
If f(s) ≥ 0.1, then we argue that svj (xi) = 0.1. Suppose for the sake of contradiction
with Lemma 12 that svj (x¯i) > 0. Observe that the payoff to player cj′ of action x¯i is
f(s) ≥ 0.1, whereas the payoff to player cj′ of action xi is svj (xi) < 0.1. So to be in
equilibrium and consistent with Lemma 12, player cj′ must place 0.1 probability on action
x¯i, and 0 probability on action xi. But this means that the payoff of action x¯i to player
vj is zero, while the payoff of action xi to player vj is 0.1. Hence player vj has placed
non-zero probability on an action that is not a pure best response, and so we have our
contradiction.
If 0 < f(s) < 0.1, then we argue that svj (xi) = f(s). We first prove that player cj′ must
play both xi and x¯i with positive probability.
If player cj′ does not play x¯i then player vj will not play xi, and player cj′ will receive
payoff 0, but in this scenario he could get f(s) > 0 by playing x¯i instead of his current
strategy.
If player cj′ does not play xi then player vj will not play x¯i. Player cj′ will receive
payoff f(s) for playing x¯i, but in this scenario he could receive payoff 1 > f(s) for
playing xi instead.
In order for player cj′ to mix over xi and x¯i in equilibrium, their payoffs must be equal.
This is only the case when svj (xi) = f(s).
J
